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For at least twelve years, Security Council reformers have proposed many
ways to enlarge the size and diversify the composition of that body. The goals
of these proposals, two of which were endorsed in the Secretary-General's 2004
Reporton HighLevelPanel on Threats,Challengesand Change,' were to make
the Council more representative of the broader membership, especially of the
developing world, while at the same time not impairing the decision-making
abilities of the Council. Everyone recognizes that the trick is how to best
balance those two competing goals.
The next President of the United States (U.S.) should take another look at
the Council reform proposals contained in the High Level Panel report. That
report outlined two models for Council reform, A and B, and any new
administration should re-examine whether a serious diplomatic effort to push
these is worthwhile. Under both proposals, the Council's membership would
expand to twenty-four states, consisting of six states each from the regions of
Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, and the Americas; neither proposal would modify
nor expand the number of veto-holding states.2 The only difference between A
and B consists of the proportions of new seats that would be permanent,
renewable, or non-renewable. The new President should also take seriously the
Panel Reports' recommendations on how to better institutionalize Art. 23 of the
United Nations (U.N.) Charter-which suggests that the Council's membership
should recognize states who contribute the most to the U.N. financially,
militarily, and diplomatically.' At the same time, there is no reason to assume
that political realities have shifted to make enlargement of the Council any
more likely now than before. It may be that enlarging the Council in the current
climate among the P-5 may aggravate the Council's paralysis. For this reason,
I will not dwell further on the prospects of reforming the Council which require
amending the U.N. Charter.
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But even if the Council's membership is not enlarged, the next U.S.
Administration should continue to push for having those elected non-permanent
members of the Council be, in their respective regions, among the top three
financial contributors to the regular budget, the top three voluntary contributors,
or the top three troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping. Other proposals in the
Secretary-General's High-level Report are also worth supporting for the sake
of greater accountability-such as its proposal for the introduction of a scheme
for "indicative voting" whereby Council members can call for public indication
of positions on proposed action, but where indicative "no" votes would not
have veto effect.4
At the same time, the next Administration needs to go beyond these wellworn reform proposals. The United States needs to address the credibility/
legitimacy concerns faced by the Council both when it fails to act and when it
acts pursuant to Chapter VII and purports to enact global legislation. Most of
the attention has rightly been on finding ways to overcome Council paralysis.
This is understandable, given the Council's many failures to act throughout the
Cold War and its more recent failings. The Council has undermined its
legitimacy when it has failed to take action to respond to clear threats to the
peace or breaches of the peace, most notably with respect to Kosovo and
Darfur, but some might add other notable cases of the Council's passivity-as
with respect to Iran.
While some would propose remedying the problem of Council inaction by
establishing a new legal principle-the Responsibility to Protect-I am not sure
that we really need new law as far as the Council is concerned. I think that the
Council's failure to act in the case of Darfur, for example, is a failure of
political will, not law. Determining what constitutes a "threat to the international peace" (a term subject to no pre-established definition under preCharter international law) is a matter for the Council to determine. No one
would suggest that it is barred from responding to humanitarian crises, even by
authorizing force pursuant to such a determination. Legal problems arise
precisely when the Council fails to act and some are tempted to act unilaterally.
With respect to the Council's inaction problem, our moderator, Tom
Franck, has characteristically made valuable pragmatic suggestions that are
worth considering anew. Back in 2002, in the wake of Kosovo, Tom Franck
suggested on the pages of the American Journal of International Law that the
Council can avoid accusations of being a paper tiger by incorporating preauthorizations to use force into its Chapter VII resolutions as appropriate.'
Under Franck's proposal, the Council would indicate when a material breach
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of its sanctions program would authorize the use of force by a regional grouping
or a coalition of the willing. Under his proposal the Council members (or the
P-5) would decide by informal arrangement that in such cases, decisions on
whether a subsequent triggering material breach had occurred would be taken
by a majority of any nine Council members without exercise of the veto. As
Franck indicated, there is a precedent for such an informal defacto amendment
of the deployment of the veto: long ago the Council decided that procedural
matters could be decided by nine of its members (without exercise of the veto).6
One could imagine other informal agreements by the P-5 not to exercise the
veto with respect to other issues as well, but of course, the prospect of such
agreements would turn on relations among the P-5.
If Franck's proposal was to be adopted, we could be spared cases
where-as with respect to Iraq in 2003-a country attempts to auto-interpret
prior Council resolutions as a license for war or numerous instances where the
Council's bark has lacked bite. As we all know, the Council's legitimacy as
collective enforcer of the peace-and the U.N.' s credibility as a whole-suffers
when either of these occur.
The next Administration also needs to concern itself with the legitimacy
of the Council when it undertakes binding Chapter VII action. It is especially
important that the next Administration carefully consider when it wants to use
the Council to impose law on the world. As many here know, the Council has
sought to impose counter-terrorism legislation on all states through Council
Resolution 1373 and its progeny. It has done similarly with respect to weapons
of mass destruction under Resolution 1540 and related resolutions. It has
imposed financial and travel sanctions on designated organizations and
individuals under resolution 1267 and other related resolutions, and it appears
to have licensed a kind of "transformative occupation law" with respect to Iraq
in resolution 1483 and later resolutions.7 All of these have triggered legitimacy
concerns. The Council was never intended to displace the vehicle par
excellence for multilateral cooperation-namely negotiations leading to the
conclusion of a treaty. It is a political body and does not have either the
bureaucratic apparatus ofan administrative agency that engages in rule making,
or the democratic credentials of a legislature charged with the making of law
in a liberal state. The potential for the Council to overstep when it engages in
global law-making was given clear voice recently when a Grand Chamber ofthe
European Court of Justice held, in the Kadi case, that the Council's counterterrorism sanctions on individuals, as implemented by European law, were
incompatible with the due process and property rights accorded persons under
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the European Convention on Human Rights.! Although the ruling sent shock
waves among international lawyers, who had become accustomed to the notion
that the Council is not subject to judicial review by anyone, the Court's finding
that it is not legitimate to brand people as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers and
penalize them by denying them access to bank accounts without showing them
the evidence of their wrongdoing or giving them the benefit to rebut that
evidence, should not, on proper reflection, have surprised anyone.
The Court invalidated the European regulation implementing the Council's
1267 sanctions, but allowed the European Council three months to find an
accommodation. I would predict that the U.N. Security Council will find a way
to incorporate the procedural rights that the European Court insisted
on-perhaps by borrowing from the procedural protections contained in the
United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 (which uses special
advocates to represent the interests of affected parties).9
The next Administration needs to heed the broader lessons of the Kadi
decision. The Council, especially when it acts as law-giver and not mere
enforcer of the peace, cannot afford to be a law onto itself. Kadi tells us that
at a time when all international organizations are under pressure to act pursuant
to law and are increasingly expected to be held politically accountable, the
Council is increasingly likely to be subjected to the political (and legal) checks
and balances that other international legal regimes face."0 This is particularly
true when the Council seeks to bypass the state and act directly on individuals.
The Council is increasingly expected to act not only in accord with the vague
"principles and purposes" of the U.N. Charter, but also in conformity with
fundamental principles of international law, especially human rights. The next
Administration may need to accept that the Council too is a creature and a
subject of law, which cannot simply be used as a tool of hegemonic power sans
restraint. The Kadi case also implies that it would behoove the Security
Council to engage in greater consultation with other bodies-including human
rights experts and the General Assembly-before it engages its all too powerful
Chapter VII powers. Michael Reisman's proposal to establish a Chapter VII
Consultation Committee consisting of a designated sub-group of the General
Assembly is certainly worth considering in this respect."
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The next Administration should also not lose sight of the fact that the
Security Council plays a singularly significant internal function at the U.N. As
U.N. observers have long recognized, the Council-and particularly the P5-have in the past effectively determined who will be selected as the U.N.'s
Secretary General. Despite what the Charter anticipates, the General Assembly
tends to ratify whatever choice emerges from within the Council. As John
Bolton's recent memoir, Surrenderis Not an Option, reminds us, in the course
of the bargaining among the P-5 over the selection of U.N. Secretary-General,
other deals are struck-such as whether the incoming Secretary-General will
replace all high ranking U.N. officials or which high level secretariat slot will
be accorded to which P-5 member in exchange for their vote. 2 This votetrading among a select group is not pretty. It does not necessarily elevate merit
as the criterion for selection. Even if we accord a discount for its self-serving
nature, John Bolton's depressing memoir ofthe selection of Ban Ki-Moon tells
us that the next Administration can do much to improve how the next U.N.
Secretary-General or other high level U.N. officials are selected. Bolton
suggests that Ban Ki-Moon was selected because, among other things, Secretary
of State Rice did not want a "strong" Secretary-General.1 3 Bolton tells us in no
uncertain terms that he pushed for Ban Ki-Moon precisely because he would
not be what he calls a 'secular pope' and was the best option given the onnegotiable demand that it was 'Asia's turn.'14 Along the way, Bolton
disparages the "High Minded" who are "always exhorting the U.N. to conduct
an 'open and transparent job search"' and who urge broad consultation.15 He
praises the side-lining of the General Assembly with respect to such decisions,
suggesting that it was a good idea to give that unruly body a 'take-it-orleave-it' choice with respect to the selection of Secretary-General. 6 While I
mean no disrespect to the current Secretary-General, I would hope that the next
Administration does the opposite of what Bolton suggests. (This would not be
a bad idea as a general piece of advice on all matters relating to the U.N., but
I digress.) One way that the U.N. can be reformed must surely be to get the best
and the brightest to run it. Given its inordinate power, the United States-and
the U.N. Security Council-can do much to make sure that this occurs.
Thank you.
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